No Fault Found events in maintenance engineering Part 1: Current trends, implications and organizational practices by Khan, Samir et al.
No Fault Found events in maintenance 
engineering Part 1: Current trends, 
implications and organizational 
practices 
Khan, S. , Phillips, P. , Jennions, I. and Hockley, C. 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited in CURVE May 2015 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Khan, S. , Phillips, P. , Jennions, I. and Hockley, C. (2014) No Fault Found events in 
maintenance engineering Part 1: Current trends, implications and organizational practices. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, volume 123 : 183–195. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2013.11.003 
 
 
Publisher statement:  NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for 
publication in Reliability Engineering & System Safety. Changes resulting from the publishing 
process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality 
control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made 
to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently 
published in Reliability Engineering & System Safety [Vol 123, (2014)]. DOI: 
10.1016/j.ress.2013.11.003. 
 
 
© 2015, Elsevier. Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. 
 
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during 
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version 
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CURVE is the Institutional Repository for Coventry University 
http://curve.coventry.ac.uk/open  
No Fault Found Events in Maintenance Engineering Part 1:
Current Trends, Implications and Organizational Practices
Samir Khana,∗, Paul Phillipsa, Ian Jennionsb, Chris Hockleyc
aEPSRC Centre, School of Applied Sciences, Cranfield University, College Road, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0AL
bIVHM Centre, School of Applied Sciences, Cranfield University, University Way, Cranfield, Bedfordshire, MK43 0FQ
cCranfield Defence and Security, Cranfield University The Mall, Shrivenham, Oxfordshire, SN6 8LA
Abstract
This paper reviews the literature dealing with the nature and characteristics of no-fault found events within maintenance lines.
Increasing systems complexities have seen a rise in the number of unknown faults that are being reported during operational
service. Units tagged as ‘No-Fault Found’ are evidence that a serviceable component was removed, and attempts to troubleshoot
the root cause have been unsuccessful. This scenario worsens when faults occurring at the component level are intermittent in
nature. Here, the paper describes the prominent issues that have persisted across a variety of industrial applications and processes
for decades. Some recent developments including standards, financial implications and safety concerns are highlighted.
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1. Introduction
The work presented in these two-part series of papers is an
attempt to review the recent developments on addressing the
root causes of No-Fault Found (NFF) events, ranging from sim-
ple faults in electronics, to the way in which an organizational
structure is setup. The novelty relies on presenting an interpre-
tative survey of NFF issues, relevant standards, organizational
procedures, economic efforts, technological solutions, diagnos-
tic challenges and recommendations on testability for managing
NFF.
Reliability analysis requires the synergy between a system-
atic approach that has clear definitions of the reliability parame-
ters, and a comprehensive collection of analysis techniques and
procedures. The reducing size of electronics and their complex
interactions have forced designers to improve their understand-
ing of failures from a multidisciplinary perspective. This be-
comes significantly important when considering a class of sys-
tem faults that cannot be easily located, diagnosed or even re-
produced under standard maintenance testing regimes [1, 2, 3].
The existence of the ‘No-Fault Found’ phenomenon has had
a definitive negative impact upon critical system stakeholder
requirements, which at the top level, often includes systems
safety, dependability and life-cycle costs. It is therefore essen-
tial to prevent NFF events or (at the very least) reduce the im-
pact it has on the business operation. To deliver stakeholder re-
quirements efficiently, certain aspects (such as suitable knowl-
edge and technical competence) must be promoted, enabling
domain experts to acquire (and retain) additional skills for long-
term professional activities [4]. Issues on safety performance
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and cost cannot be compromised, and hence it is essential to dis-
cuss topics on information quality (when data is presented to the
operators), response times (on early symptoms of failure) and
knowledge ambiguity (on operation and maintenance of equip-
ment) of the test procedures and practices in place. These argu-
ments place an emphasis on the requirement to prepare main-
tenance experts with specialized intelligent systems, which can
detect early anomalies and capture adequate information for in-
vestigation.
Both papers provide an industrial outlook to the problem,
Part 1 in particular covers the following key areas:
1. Research Methodology
2. The Problem Statement
3. Understanding the Taxonomy
4. Standards in NFF
5. Organizational Procedures and Adminstration
6. Financial Imperatives
7. Safety Implications
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
describes the methodology adopted to conduct this review. Re-
cent trends and targeted journals has been highlighted. Section
3 presents the literature associated with NFF events, economi-
cal impact on the business and customers. Sections 4 and 5 pro-
vide discussions on NFF taxonomy and organizational/cultural
aspects, respectively, followed by sections on financial implica-
tions and safety considerations. In the end, some conclusions
are reached from the preceding theoretical analysis.
2. Research Methodology
One of the goals of this study is to understand the state of
current NFF research. This is accomplished by investigating the
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existing published material to yield insights for industrial prac-
titioners and academic researchers on the major trends, signif-
icant works, and future directions. Therefore, the authors have
compiled a systematic reference point for burgeoning NFF lit-
erature. As research within this area is of practical importance,
the scope of this investigation covers the time frame between
1990-2013, whilst concentrating on the last decade in particu-
lar (as this period has been deemed to be have contributed the
most papers on the topic). To accomplish the study aims, this
research is based reviewing a variety of journals and conference
articles, all of which are directly related to NFF concepts and its
application. Due to the scope and diversity, articles were found
to be scattered across a range of sources, and thus a literature
search was conducted using the following electronic databases:
1. Scopus
2. Emerald insight
3. Science Direct
4. IEEE Xplorer
5. IET Digital Library
One of the main challenges as part of this review was the lack
of a unique/exclusive term that can signify NFF events, since a
true gauge of the problem is difficult to investigate. Therefore,
the literature search was based on the following descriptors:
1. No Fault Found (NFF)
2. Cannot Duplicate (CND)
3. Fault Not Found (FNF)
4. No Trouble Found (NTF)
5. No Defect Found (NDF)
6. Hidden Failures
7. False failures
All of these listed terms have actually been used by organiza-
tions to describe similar events (with some subtle differences).
None-the-less, this article assembles all of the above descrip-
tors under the NFF umbrella, and makes a recommendation for
establishing a formal NFF taxonomy.
Before continuing any further, the authors would like to dis-
cuss the limitations associated with this review:
1. A limited descriptors are used (as listed earlier)
2. The findings are based on information that was collected
from academic journals, conferences and discussions with
maintenance personnel
3. A limited number of papers were used (only the articles in
the selected databases have been included)
4. The time period is limited between 1990-2013
The authors believe this review to be a comprehensive one, and
can be used for gaining an understanding of NFF knowledge.
Also, despite the fact that the selected time period spans over
the last two decades; the last ten years are believed to be the
most productive from a research point-of-view, and hence will
be able to enrich the contents of these papers.
Following the database searches, articles were then reviewed
in order to eliminate the ones which were not related to NFF.
In total, the authors were able to identify 154 published pa-
pers for the period 1986-2013; this includes 38 published jour-
nals, 84 conference papers and an additional 32 journal publi-
cations (which were cited by the papers). Although these two
papers present conclusions primarily based on the identified 38
journals, the other 116 papers (32 journals and 84 conference
papers) have been used to assist with underlying discussions
through out the review process. Furthermore, each retrieved ar-
ticle was carefully reviewed prior to making a judgment with
regards to its inclusion in this survey.
Table 1: Breakdown of targeted journals for the 38 NFF publications
Journal No of articles
Microelectronics Reliability 7
Quality in Maintenance Engineering 5
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 3
Journal of Aerospace Engineering 2
IEEE Design & Test of Computers 2
IEEE Transactions on Reliability 2
SAE Technical paper 2
Test Engineering and Management 2
Quality and Reliability Engineering Inter-
national
2
IEEE Transactions on Components and
Packaging Technologies
1
CIRP Annals-Manufacturing Technology 1
IEEE Transactions on Dielectrics and
Electrical Insulation
1
Journal of Productivity and Quality Man-
agement
1
IEEE Transactions on Device and Materi-
als Reliability
1
Research in Engineering Design 1
Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Tech-
nology
1
International Journal of COMADEM 1
Electronic Product Design 1
IEEE Transactions on Electronics Packag-
ing Manufacturing
1
Journal of Design Research 1
Table 1 lists the journals that have been targeted for publica-
tion of NFF research; where all 20 journals are related to system
reliability and maintenance. This is an interesting result as one
of the major current issues with NFF are the cost implications1,
but there are no business oriented or cost related publications
that can highlight its importance. In any case, despite the fact
that the authors believe that journals should be the primary re-
source that must be used to acquire and disseminate knowledge;
due to the scale of the subject area, some conference papers,
news reports, and unpublished working papers were included
to help with the underlying discussion/context.
1This is discussed in Section 7 on Page 10.
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Figure 1: Classification of NFF journal publications since 1990
2.1. Classification of the reviewed literature
The authors have grouped each of the 38 journal articles
under specific categories, which involved several discussions
amongst all four authors until a mutual agreement was reached
as to where an article should be classified. The structure in-
cludes a content-oriented categorization of the NFF literature
into four main areas. These themes were identified, through an
interactive dialog with senior industrial delegates, as being the
most influential contributors to the NFF problem [5]:
1. Fault diagnostics - this includes publications that discuss
aspects of NFF comprising of sensors, troubleshooting,
fault isolation manual, calibration of built-in-tests and en-
vironmental effects
2. System design - this includes publications that discuss op-
erational feedback, Key performance indicators or bench-
marking and cost implications.
3. Human factors - this includes publications that discuss
supply chain, communication, training/education, correct
use of equipment, warranty claims and accountability
4. Data management - this includes publications that discuss
data trending, e-logs, data fusion/mining
Table 2 lists the 38 articles, and how they have been classi-
fied. This will be a very useful resource for researchers search-
ing for journals within a specific area. Fig. 1 demonstrates the
increasing interest in the area from a maintenance engineering
perspective2, where fault diagnostics and system design appear
to be the main focus through out the listed years. These are
probably due to increasing system complexities and cost impli-
cations on maintenance programmes. Also, this is possibly due
to the downgrading of the world economy since 2008, forcing
e.g. civil airliners having to reduce costs, whilst increasing the
2A similar trend was observed from the number of conference papers that
have been presented in the last five years, where the leading three conferences
that published NFF papers include: Annual Reliability and Maintainability
Symposium, IEEE Aerospace Conference and IEEE AUTOTESTCON.
availability of their aircraft. In the military domain government
spending cuts, particularly within the UK, have significantly
downsized the workforce available for maintenance activities,
and hence has had a knock on effect on maintenance regimes.
Table 2: Classification of NFF literature
Category References
Fault diagnostics [1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
System design [1, 13, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23,
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31,
32]
Human factors [1, 20, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]
Data management [1, 20, 37, 38, 39]
1 [1, 26] are review papers on the NFF.
3. The Problem Statement
A typical maintenance process within an organization can be
observed in Fig. 2. Here, it is important to understand the con-
cept of how NFF instances can manifest themselves at various
levels. When an operator records a system error, maintenance
personnel are notified, who will attempt to investigate the rea-
son for the system malfunction. If no causes are discovered,
the failure will be tagged as ‘No Fault Found’. There may be
various reasons that contribute to this overall process. Perhaps
the operator (or maintainer) lacks of knowledge of the system,
or has received insufficient support to carry out the fault diag-
nosis. There can be many reasons including having minimal
understanding of the manuals, lack of equipment or operational
pressures. Such occurrences have predominantly been associ-
ated with electronic equipment [1, 32, 24, 13].
The aerospace industry has reported the majority share of
electronic NFF faults, primarily within aircraft avionics. Al-
though, some studies suggest that NFF events generally occur
after an initial warning alarm has been triggered, indicating a
system fault [1, 7]. This alarm, which does not provide any
other direct diagnostic information, triggers maintenance activ-
ities that ‘repair’ the faulty unit as it is removed for testing.
During the testing phase, the situation arises where the same
symptoms cannot be detected (or reproduced) with the stan-
dardized test equipment and procedures, or the exact nature (or
location) of the fault is unable to be determined; as a result the
unit is labeled NFF. This can be regarded as a ‘diagnostic fail-
ure’ (or Fault Not Found) and the actions or procedures which
are then taken by the organization responsible for the mainte-
nance activity are of paramount importance to ensure safety and
reduced costs.
In this paper, the common causes of NFF events are catego-
rized into the following set of classes: technical, organizational,
procedural and behavioral. Technical causes involve things
such as undefined or limited performance measures, inadequate
information on operating environment, designs unsuitable for
robust testing or a lack of robust fault models. Organizational
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Figure 2: The simplified repair process during a maintenance action.
and procedural issues are driven by the business and commer-
cial environment and encompass a lack of training and train-
ing tools, time pressures on maintenance operations, organiza-
tional cultures with no cross-functionality; in addition a lack
of commitment, sharing information and knowledge between
designers, manufacturers, service providers and operators are
also organizational issues. Behavioral causes, commonly also
referred to as ‘human factors’, arise directly from the mainte-
nance personnel themselves, and are created by staff creating
discrepancies in test procedures, reporting faults incorrectly or
incoherently, applying the wrong processes coupled with a lack
of communication between maintenance personnel and other
experts.
Khan et al. (2012) [40] have attempted to address the scale
of the problem as a sequence of events. The sequence begins
during operational service when a Built-In-Test (BIT) fails (or
the operator reports the possibility of an error), and independent
functionality tests are then triggered to verify the fault/failure.
If it cannot be repeated, a failure to diagnose the problem is
recorded. If the functionality tests fail, then further off-line tests
within the maintenance shop/depth are used to diagnose the sys-
tem fault to a group of Shop Replaceable Units (SRUs) that
are suspected of being the source of the Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU) failure. Depending upon the accuracy of the diagnosis
at this level, ideally only one SRU is called out; less precise
diagnostics might call out two, three or more SRUs. The com-
ponents are then sent back to the depot/workshop for functional
testing using Automatic Test Equipment (ATE), where it will
be concluded if the component was healthy or falsely replaced,
or it is definitely faulty and the diagnostic testing is inadequate
[41].
James et al. (2003) [42] investigated various NFF situations
while focusing on developing practical guidance for designers
and project managers to facilitate better understanding of the
unknown failures and procedural improvements. The research
summarized a comprehensive breakdown of the potential rea-
sons for NFF events:
1. Operator Policies (e.g. short turn round times, availability
of spares, aircrew mission priorities)
2. Failure in recording/reporting (e.g. quality of aircrew de-
brief, poor data coding)
3. Maintenance practice (e.g. lack of maintainers training,
technical publications inaccuracy)
4. Repeat removals (e.g. little use of maintenance history,
‘rogue units’ )
5. Workshop ineffectiveness (e.g. pressure to produce
throughput, lack of staff training)
6. Inadequate test coverage (e.g. test philosophy across
maintenance levels, comprehensiveness of test)
7. Interpretation of results (e.g. fault code interpretation,
training of workshop staff)
8. Intermittent system connection (e.g. connector integrity,
harness/loom integrity)
9. Product contains intermittent faults (e.g. solder joints,
PCB weakness)
10. Incompatible system design (e.g. BITE coverage, software
tolerances)
It is clear that a great many of the diagnostic failure events
which are of interest occur in electrical and electro-mechanical
systems, but research shows that mechanical systems also give
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rise to similar difficulties, but are far less published. The causes
of failures in these systems are similar to those in electrical sys-
tems, such as ageing, poor maintenance, incorrect installation
or usage; however, it seems that it is much easier to predict the
effects upon the systems operation with mechanical failures. As
a result this allows an inspection criteria to be developed during
the design phases. It should be noted that as with many elec-
trical failures, mechanical failures can be intermittent in nature
and only occur under specific operating conditions [40].
In electronic systems, loose connections probably cover most
of the fault cases that have been published as NFF [13, 43].
Some of the more common and well known include poor solder
joints, faulty electrical components, damaged PCBs and prob-
lems with internal wiring. In addition, electronic failures are
not considered as static (or random) events, but a process of
mechanical and material changes. These changes will not al-
ways lead to a loss of operation for the system, even though
their components are out of specification. This is because
electronics have an inherent self-compensating aspect which
makes the task of diagnostics difficult. In addition to this self-
compensation, degradation of failure modes will manifest dif-
ferently depending upon the operating environment and may
offset one another depending on circuit configuration [43].
3.1. Business Impact
Customers often fall under two categories: those that main-
tain their own fleet (e.g. aircraft, vehicles, ships, etc) without
assistance, and those who sub-contract their fleet maintenance
completely (or partly) to a maintenance contractor. NFF events
impose a maintenance burden on both of these, the former for
the customer, and the latter for the maintenance contractor.
When the failure occurs, there is an increase on the fault arising
rate3, leading to financial implications on maintenance (due to
repeated investigation and equipment exchange) and the supply
chain costs (due to potentially serviceable equipment being re-
turned for repair). There will also be a reduction in the overall
availability of the fleet, depending on the reliability, maintain-
ability and logistical factors, all of which contribute to the cost
of resolving an unknown fault.
The costs involved with NFF issues can often be quantified
by measuring the proportion of the repair budget that is spent
or ‘wasted’ on the maintenance activities involved in locating
the root cause of the failure. Most avionics engineers agree that
the estimated NFF rates for any given system or equipment is
between 30%-50% [1, 44]. Consider the theoretical scenario:
An avionics equipment, fitted to a fleet of aircraft fails every
300 hours. The fleet flies 30,000 hours per year, and the cost
to return one equipment through the supply chain for repair is
approximated to be £10,000. With the worst-case NFF rate at
50%:
Fault rate: 30,000300 = 100 returns per year
NFF occurrence: 50% of 100 = 50
50 NFF returns cost 50 x £10,000 = £500,000 per year
3NFF is generally regarded as a fault for statistical purposes, although, some
industries may use discrete fault codes
The numbers above are estimates for just one complex equip-
ment. Combat aircraft have many other items that cause signif-
icant annual expenditure on NFF. In addition, there are hidden
costs of ‘at aircraft’ diagnosis and recovery including spare-
parts, maintenance man-hours, aircraft down-time, etc., which
indicates that the NFF burden for a typical fleet becomes £Mil-
lions per annum.
4. Understanding the Taxonomy
Moffat (2008) [12] advocates that taxonomies of the electri-
cal, mechanical, chemical and thermal stresses are a contribut-
ing factor to the various stages of ageing and/or failure. If this
argument is extended, it becomes necessary to understand what
exactly is meant by ‘an NFF failure’. It should be emphasized
that the authors have not yet identified any singular agreement
about its term, use and application within common industry or-
ganizations, let alone commonality in meaning across industry
sectors. This is exacerbated by the sheer number of terms and
disparities in the taxonomy, which is used to describe the failure
event itself, particularly in different countries. Within the UK
(and most of Europe), the acronym ‘NFF’ has generally been
adopted. In the USA, terms such as ReTest OK (RTOK), Can-
not Duplicate (CND), Trouble-Not-Isolated (TNI), Fault Not
Indicated (FNI) and No Trouble Found (NTF) are but a few
of the more common variants. However, fundamentally they
are all evidently applied to the same event, which requires ex-
ploration to try and arrive at a clear and concise solution to a
reported problem. The proliferation of terms certainly suggest
the need for a definition of the NFF phenomenon.
A set of NFF guidelines were introduced within the ARINC
672 report [45], presenting an generic procedure that can help
understand the fundamental principles, relationships, mecha-
nisms and interactions connected to NFF failure situations. The
ARINC 672 also presented an NFF definition for the airline in-
dustry, defined as: “Removals of equipment from service for
reasons that cannot be verified by the maintenance process
(shop or elsewhere)”. But the problem is really even boarder
than this as the statement should also cover cases when no fault
is found at the aircraft (or equipment), due to which it is re-
turned to service with nothing found. Also, many faults that are
classified as NFF do not result in equipment removal from the
aircraft4. So perhaps NFF should be described more as a main-
tenance failure: Any reported fault which results in nugatory
maintenance and logistical effort [20]. To achieve high rates of
diagnostic success is surely what is expected from any main-
tenance activity. This implies identification of a root cause, if
there is one, or positive identification that there is no root cause
if otherwise. Only in that case will the correct and most appro-
priate maintenance activity be carried out, allowing removed
units’ integrity to be ensured and hence able to be safely re-
turned to service.
What becomes clear, whilst reviewing the associated lit-
erature and discussions with various industrial organizations
4many varied factors can cause this e.g. operator policy, operational expe-
diency, etc
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Table 3: Results from a Recent survey showing a disparity in terminology.
Term Use (%)
No Fault Found 56
Unable to Reproduce Fault 18
Cannot Duplicate 14
No Trouble Found 4
Repeat Arising 2
Re-test OK 2
Fault Not Found 2
No Evidence of Failure 1
A-799 1
within the UK, is that there are no approved code of practices
in place to ensure correct identification, reporting and mitiga-
tion of these problems. It seems that the disparity between ter-
minology and definitions may have affected the ability to deal
with the NFF issue, despite the earliest call for standardization
of taxonomy for NFF being in Simpson et al. [46]. Therefore, a
notable driver that contributes to the problem is the lack of stan-
dardization, clarity and inappropriate usage of taxonomies. Ta-
ble 3 shows the results of a recent survey conducted by Coper-
nicus Technology Ltd into the causes and perceptions of NFF
in the aerospace industry, responded to by approximately 120
aerospace organizations [47]. The results show that approxi-
mately half of the respondents refer to it as ‘No-Fault Found’,
but the other half refers to it in a variety of other terms.
To introduce a change, there is a definite need for establish-
ing policies, procedures and in some cases an overhaul of the
terminology used for NFF events [48]. UK aerospace engineers
have expressed their belief that the term ‘No-Fault Found’ quite
possibly provides a hindrance in reducing NFF events. The
start of this may be to describe the issue as a ‘Fault Not Found’
[40, 42], which has a more positive behavioral sense, rather than
NFF, which suggests an attitude of resignation, that there was
probably no fault there anyway. In order to culturally shift the
workforce to change from the general reactive mentality on to
a much more proactive approach, FNF implies that more work
has to be done to solve the problem. It may also be the case that
NFF requires branches of sub-terms to describe the event from
the perspective of different levels. In any case, in order to be
objective, it must be recognisee that not all industry sectors will
agree with this aerospace stance. A leading international con-
struction vehicle manufacturer disagrees with the need for this
and has claimed that changing and adopting a universal name
will not change anything. The problem is still the same [40]:
“We used the term ‘Trouble Not Identified’ for a while years
ago. We got that term from automotive. It just confused people.
The culture of acceptance is driven from a lack of understand-
ing of the real drivers of NFF”.
What is interesting about this statement is the idea that there
is a lack of understanding on ‘. . . the real drivers of NFF’. This
supports what is being seen in the literature with over simplified
descriptive terms, attempts to classify the root cause as NFF
rather than recognizing it as an element in a chain of events
which are influenced by organizational behavior and culture as
well as processes and procedures. These are the drivers which
need to be understood and it is believed by the authors that stan-
dardizing taxonomy, unifying definitions, championing the cor-
rect terminology and creating a high level of coherency are es-
sential to push forward the understanding of these driving fac-
tors.
5. Standards for NFF
Standards can be used to guide industries to effectively pro-
mote efficient operation and improve reliability. Specific best
practices can be tailored to different application areas; and are
currently used for maintenance support that advocate develop-
ing policies to meet process objectives. Specific standards have
been introduced over the years to improve system maintenance,
and to reduce overall scheduling costs, e.g. the Reliability
Centered Maintenance standards (RCM) i.e. IEC 60300-3-11
[49] and SAE JA1012 [50], present guidelines for developing
and regulating an initial maintenance programme, and the IEC
60706-5 [51] for enabling improved equipment maintainability
through better testability features.
Another top-down approach which was introduced (particu-
larly for aircraft maintenance) to provide significant improve-
ments in availability and operational safety (whilst optimizing
the costs of ownership), and has gone through a number re-
visions, is called Maintenance Steering Group-3 (MSG-3) [52].
This maintenance programme can effectively be tailored around
reliability by any operator depending on historical data. Under
MSG-3, maintenance tasks are broken down into zones, where
all potential components are serviced/replaced in one shot, in-
stead of having to go back multiple times to rectify the is-
sue. The maintenance tasks and component replacements are
no longer based on hard time limits, but rather based on relia-
bility trending. This greatly reduces many repetitive tasks, and
provides time and costs savings for airlines/operators. It should
be noted that NFF events (also called ‘hidden failures’ within
MSG-3) are analyzed as parts of multiple failures, and such
failures on their own do no have any consequence. Here, the
goal of preventive maintenance is to guarantee the availability
of the system components that are essential to avoid the effects
of multiple failures on safety, operation or economy. The ques-
tion to speculate here is whether there are any NFF failures that
can affect some components which directly impact the system
operation (or production).
Recently, a set of procedures were introduced in the AR-
INC 672 Report [45], are directly aimed to provide the basis
for a structured process for addressing the NFF problem in the
aviation industry. As illustrated in Fig. 3, it provides criteri-
ons for decision taking regarding root causes, and describes the
importance of taking maintenance actions at an early stage of
the component repair cycle. It further highlights the necessary
means of reducing costs by avoiding unwanted removing units
from the aircraft. It should be noted that the guidelines are pro-
vided to be customized for specific operations environments.
It appears that there is a requirement in the design and pro-
duction stages, to develop a more fault-tolerant system with re-
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Figure 3: The ARINC 672 NFF Reduction process provides an interactive
framework for various domains when customizing interdisciplinary processes.
duce NFF rates. An essential part will be to establish cross-
discipline features and design solutions that can be applied to
any engineering design. This will involved multi-disciplinary
modelling of the root causes of NFF achieved by understanding
and modeling electronic, mechanical and software interactions.
Such an approach can lead to the development of design guides
(or a handbook) covering the processes to be followed for the
avoidance of the root causes of NFF at the design stage. Of
course, these need to cover accurate fault models, fault trees,
system understanding (to aid in recognizing false BIT alarm
caused by e.g. sensors), system synchronisation problems (al-
lowing root causes of BIT deficiencies). In order to compli-
ment any design guidance and rule sets, solutions are required
in order to link service experience with design knowledge to
generate an official guidance standard to reduce NFF occur-
rences throughout a system life-cycle. These must be evaluated
through a series of practical case evaluations within collaborat-
ing companies and through expert judgement.
There seems to be a lack of comprehensive international stan-
dards that deal with the NFF issue; which is also clouded by
inconsistent terminology. It would therefore be useful to work
towards harmonizing a set of generic maintenance-related stan-
dards that utilize a common terminology and framework; and
the ARINC is a positive development moving towards the right
direction.
6. Organizational Procedures and Administration
It is commonly accepted that the NFF phenomena arises from
a minimum of two test levels [1]. At any test level, a fault may
be recognisee and localized as belonging to an individual piece
of equipment which, when re-tested, at a subsequent level, the
recognition/localisation of the reported fault may be unsuccess-
ful. This therefore means that a NFF event has occurred which
arises from a number of reasons. It may be that the test at the
preceding level was correct, but the attempts to subsequently
replicate it at a subsequent level have failed. Perhaps this is due
to the inability to re-create the conditions under which the pre-
ceding test was carried out, discrepancies in test procedure or
human error. The second main reason could be that the error at
the preceding level was incorrectly recognisee [53].
There is clear distinction between Cannot Duplicate (CND)
and Retest OK (RTOK). CND occurs at the same level of main-
tenance where the fault was reported and RTOK occurs at sub-
sequent levels of maintenance [41]. This leads to the conclu-
sions that RTOK is a ‘true’ term which can be used for NFF.
Even though it is in much of the literature CND however should
not be technically described as NFF will only occur at 2nd line
maintenance. This maintenance process is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Jones and Hayes (2001) [13] argue that there are predomi-
nately three identifiable levels of where NFF events can occur:
1. Equipment Level: The operators find that the equipment
does not function correctly and as a result a maintenance
action is scheduled. The engineer however finds no prob-
lems during maintenance testing. This is carried out at 2nd
line maintenance.
2. Board Level: The operators find that the equipment does
not function correctly and during maintenance testing the
engineer finds that a problem does exist and identifies a
board to be removed and returned for repair. When subse-
quently tested, however the board functions correctly. This
usually represents 3rd line maintenance.
3. Component level: The board that has been removed is
subsequently tested and a faulty component is identified.
This component is replaced and the removed component is
found on subsequent failure analysis to be functioning cor-
rectly. After the component has been replaced the board
operates normally. This maintenance activity is usually
carried out by the original equipment manufacturer.
It is still necessary not to neglect the fact that at some stage
an event has occurred, be this a false alarm or component degra-
dation, which has resulted in maintenance actions as described
above (ending with a NFF decision). This event is known as
the root cause of NFF and from literature studies can be at-
tributed to several distinct types. Some typical root causes in-
clude [1, 40, 45, 54]:
1. Discrepancies and faults in test procedures: Such errors in
process and procedures might exist but they are not known
and lie unidentified but nevertheless generate NFF.
2. Incorrect fault reporting: Communication and having a
common understanding and interpretation of the fault is
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Figure 4: Test and Diagnostic Processes in Electronics.
sometimes just not achievable. People’s perceptions and
interpretation often mean the fault will not be properly di-
agnosed and found. There are also clearly human factors
that are involved here.
3. Wrong processes applied: This may be deliberate through
misinterpretation and presumed symptoms but also could
be just lack of proper training.
4. Incomplete documentation: This cause might be processes
that were not comprehensive when first devised.
6.1. Human Factors and Culture
Cultural factors clearly have similarities with human factors
but tend to describe the corrective aspect rather than the indi-
vidual. Often an organization can be overly bureaucratic and
cumbersome in its response to change and may not even recog-
nisee that it has a problem. However, it is becoming more
widely acknowledged that one of the most significant contrib-
utory factors of NFF events are attributed to the behavior, skill
sets and communication between an organization’s technicians,
engineers and management personnel [5]. The problem here
lies more at the human level as there are so many human fail-
ings related to the variety of ways that faults are reported, the
ways maintenance manuals that are written and presented, and
the ways troubleshooting tests are designed. Adding the mix
of training, expertise and experience that each engineer has in
troubleshooting will affect how a company approaches NFF
events. However, there are often insufficient resources to re-
pair items on time, as well as not enough information, training
and tools [55]. Hughes and Kornowa-Weichel (2004) [56] ad-
vocate that modern tools and equipment must be designed with
the potential capabilities and limitations of the maintainers in
mind. This also applies to fault detection in a maintenance en-
vironment where human factors should be taken into account to
improve safety, reliability, efficiency and quality of job perfor-
mance [57].
In any case, reasons that have been recognisee are often sim-
ilar to those recognisee at the individual level that affects an
individual’s behavior:
1. Lack of communication [58]: At the personal level, per-
haps between maintenance personnel when changing shift,
poor communication may cause the new shift to misdiag-
nose the problem. Similarly lack of communication be-
tween experts in the organization means that vital infor-
mation is not passed on to those who might then solve a
regularly reported fault but on different equipment.
2. Not following the correct process [34]: Technicians can
be known to take short cuts because they ‘know best’ or
they may make repeated assumptions which are incorrect.
Operational pressures often cap the time available to line
maintenance personnel for troubleshoot and are probably
the major drivers for such behavior.
3. Workforce behavior [59]: Within the workforce behavior
there is a reliance on norms that is prevalent: ‘we have al-
ways done it this way and it always works’. People are
reluctant to admit their behavior, procedures and culture
might be part of the problem. But whilst it will always get
the equipment back on line, it may have involved chang-
ing three units where only one is truly at fault but now
they have generated two NFFs in the system with all the
attendant costs in the maintenance and supply chain.
Within industry, given the variety of NFF sources, each key
player (such as the manufacturer’s maintenance suppliers and
operators) all approach NFF differently. This arises due to the
nature of their self-interests and differing viewpoints, for ex-
ample, do they take a company or a strategic view. Each of
these key players therefore tends not to be transparent in the ap-
proaches which they adopt and the transference of knowledge
and expertise in dealing with NFF is not part of the culture. Or-
ganizational culture may dictate that, taking a machine oﬄine,
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or grounding an aircraft for a period of time, should take place
at an appropriate time and for a period no longer than abso-
lute necessary. As a result, the situation arises where internal
pressure is placed upon the maintenance personnel to reduce
their maintenance turnaround times [34]. This leads to a cul-
ture where units are replaced rather than the ‘root cause’ of a
failure being identified and fixed.
The following are a key selection of issues within the organi-
zational and workforce culture category:
1. Time pressures on maintenance operations [1]: There is
an overriding need to get equipment back into service
quickly. Availability of the equipment for service provides
an overwhelming pressure on diagnosis and maintenance
actions. This means that often On Speculative (On-Spec)
replacements or maintenance actions is the quickest solu-
tion that may involve removing several LRUs, an activ-
ity that causes NFF further down the supply chain but has
solved the fault at the original equipment. All too often,
the pressure to return the equipment to service means that
changing the three LRUs will be quicker than doing any
detailed diagnostics to determine which of the three actu-
ally requires repair. The result, though, is that now there
is one LRU that has the fault, and another two that will
show up as NFF when subject to tests at the next level in
the repair chain.
2. Organizational cultures: In many organizations, there is no
cross-functionality, employee empowerment and encour-
agement to identify the root causes of reported faults. In
other words wrong behaviors have been allowed to grow
and take root. According to Murphy and Pate-Cornell
(1996) [57], failures of complex engineered systems are
often the result of management or organizational factors
that influence the decisions of individuals. Thus, there
could be organizational pressures affecting the work of
technicians on complex systems leading to failures. An
depicted in Fig. 5, an organization may influence the state
of the individual (e.g. via selection, screening, training
and workload), or it may affect their situation (e.g. infor-
mation, procedure, organizational structure and culture);
either of which can affect an individual’s action and thus
have an overall effect on system risk.
3. Inadequate training or lack of training tools [60]: It is ar-
gued that NFF failure can escalate to become a safety is-
sue, if the operator has not maintained a comprehensive
training discipline for crews and line maintenance person-
nel. Therefore, training needs to competent if compli-
cated diagnostics is to be achieved. Morris and Rouse
(1985) [61] identified four training approaches to teach
troubleshooting strategies to operators in order to identify
and fix system faults:
i Instruction of the theory; explaining the system func-
tioning
ii Troubleshooting practice exercises
iii Guidance in the use of system knowledge, i.e. where
to find the information, which manuals to use and how
iv Guidance in the use of algorithms or rules
Organizational level 
Organizational structure, policy,
procedures, incentives, information,
selection and screening, training,
organizational culture, resource
constraints, ... 
Action level Operation, maintenance, 
contruction, crisis response
Physical system level 
Management factors
Decisions and actions
Performance
Failure probability
Component failure rates, system 
configurations, dependencies, 
loads on system...
Figure 5: Generalized influence diagram of human and management effects on
system risk.
For troubleshooting, it can be asked whether it is better for
a maintainer to learn to deal with problems according to
procedures or by getting more knowledge about how the
systems work. For familiar faults, the two types of ap-
proach worked equally well. But for novel faults, as the
system-trained technicians have a superior mental model
of the system, they used a better problem solving strategy
which gave better results [4]. In addition, as a result of
more and more automation being implemented into sys-
tems, traditional training approaches become less effective
[62]. Thus it is better for the maintainers to form a mental
model of the overall functional structure of the system to
understand its contingencies and interactions, rather than
accumulating compartmentalized knowledge.
4. Sharing information: There needs to be a culture and com-
mitment to share knowledge between designers, manufac-
turers, service providers and operators. This may be eas-
ier said than done but it needs a system in place to share
appropriate information between all the stakeholders to
enable an effective, speedy transfer of shared knowledge.
Soderholm (2007) [1] points out that there may be a num-
ber of possible weaknesses in using manuals as a means
for sharing information, including poor sequence activi-
ties, a lack of accuracy or completeness, and a lack of user-
friendliness. Another issue that renders the technician’s
trouble-shooting task even more difficult is that there can
be ineffective and often ambiguous test requirements re-
sulting from a lack of distinction between physical faults
and the functional anomalies by which they are detected
and isolated.
5. Other major issues include:
i Reluctance to change: Solutions that are likely to be
disruptive to normal working practices are seen as un-
necessary and a challenge to technical skills. Often an
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organization will not change because in their view the
organization is not the problem.
ii Inadequate historical data: It is essential that fault his-
tory on the equipment is known. Often the techni-
cian does not have the particular equipment’s history
to look at so the fact that the same fault is reoccurring
is not obvious.
iii Ineffective Communication: This often manifests it-
self as lack of fleet or manufacturer advice. It may be
that a particular fault is being seen across the fleet or a
procedure is being improved by the manufacturer and
this information, or rather solution would be relevant
and stop some NFF but it is not being communicated.
7. Financial Implications
Williams et. al (1998) [10] claim that NFF failures can make
up more than 85% of all observed field failures within avion-
ics components. They also account for more than 90% of all
maintenance costs, which can be can be attributed to:
1. A limited understanding of root cause failure characteris-
tics of a complex system
2. inappropriate means of diagnosing the condition of the
system
3. The inability to duplicate the field conditions in the labo-
ratory
NFF events pose problems to almost everyone who is in-
volved with the operational service - from customers to man-
ufacturers, and their suppliers. There is however other major
impacts upon business costs that are not so easily quantifiable
such as the supply chain, maintenance performance, capacity,
as well as indirect effects such as customer perception [63].
Janamanchi and Jin (2010) [64] recently proposed a financial
model to analyze the trade-off between the financial benefits of
reliability improvement and the costs associated with the im-
plementation of Highly Accelerated Stress Screening (HASS)5
in the context of manufacturing the automatic test equipment.
The direct economic issues from NFF events are caused by
putting units through the maintenance chain (replacement, log-
ging, packaging, shipping, teasing and documenting) for no ap-
parent reason. The impact of NFF could range from a mere nui-
sances, to increased financial costs, through to risking safety.
Without high levels of confidence that a reported fault is not
fixed correctly the first time, along with a high probability of
re-occurrence, there will be a measurable impact on the busi-
ness output.
Direct maintenance costs of any system can make a signif-
icant contribution to its overall cost of ownership. Wu et. al
(2004) [22] identified that design and fault diagnosis are the key
factors that influence such costs, whilst discussing a mainte-
nance free operating period, and a fault diagnosis expert system
5Highly Accelerated Stress Screening (HASS) is a reliability screening pro-
cess that is widely used to eliminate infant mortality, and hence improve the
product mean time between failures.
for improvements. However, a large proportion of cost spent on
NFF events can be attributed to warranty claims [26, 31, 55].
Depending on how the maintenance contract is setup, claims
can be made to include human factors [65, 56] or intermittent
failures [1, 60] (which constitutes quite a large proportion of the
entire claim population). Prakash et al. (2009) [38] presented
a methodology to determine optimal process adjustments in or-
der to eliminate warranty related NFF product failures. Also,
another method to minimize product warranty costs will be by
embedding reliability in the early development phase of the sys-
tem i.e. by designing out potential failure modes due to hard-
ware, software, process and customer usage issues [66]. Ei-
ther way, there will be a need for adequate data and evidence
on the cost of NFF in order to make management recognisee
the need to make the change. The costs, however, may not be
so easy to establish and there is evidence to suggest that un-
der many circumstances there is not even a willingness to es-
tablish what the NFF related costs are. As far as procedures
and rules are concerned, defence organizations will necessarily
cite the situation that military aircraft are built to safe-life cri-
teria where there is no redundancy, unlike commercial aircraft
built to fail-safe standards; this the RAF would maintain pre-
clude them from adopting many of the new practices adopted
by commercial operators such as the Subject To Aircraft Check
(STAC) approach6. However, consider an organization such as
the UK military. There used to be no real incentive to solve that
part of the problem because their own maintenance and supply
organizations would cope with the extra repairs required and
indeed justified their existence. The organization is also too big
and cumbersome to make the necessary changes easily. There
were plenty of people but there was little focus on rising costs
of such wasteful efforts.
7.1. In Aviation Systems
The problem is certainly not confined to any one sector, and
various successes have been achieved in different industries at
reducing costs. However the investment cost for NFF resolu-
tion is probably higher in the aircraft industry as equipment is
more expensive, and downtime causes a large loss in revenue.
Wasteful maintenance, whether it is at the aircraft, or further
removed in the service support area, will cost a great deal of
money for valuable resources, e.g. transportation costs of mov-
ing removed units to the appropriate workshop or manufacturer,
which also includes the additional time spent on further testing
and diagnostics. Other logistical activities also include the costs
of processing activities and storage of the removed LRU’s. A
fault that re-occurs often doubles the costs [1], not to mention
producing great frustration for managers, engineers and the op-
6Subject To Aircraft Check (STAC) is an procedure introduced in civil avi-
ation, which aims to reduce the likelihood of NFF occurring in the second line
bays, while allowing licensed engineers to replace a component with a known
serviceable item. If the aircraft suffers the same fault during its next flight (or
very soon after), it is possible the originally removed item was in fact ‘ser-
viceable’. That item will therefore be returned to stock as ‘STAC serviceable’.
If, however, the aircraft does not display the same fault, the item follows the
normal route to second/third/fourth line.
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erators who rely on a reliable, working and cost-effective prod-
uct. It is hence widely acknowledged that reducing NFF events
have the potential to reduce overall maintenance costs in every
industry in which they occur. These costs can be realized in
terms of optimization of spare parts, increased logistic efficien-
cies, reductions in workshop time improved test equipment and
personnel training.
Another factor is if numerous products exhibit NFF problems
(or a single product has a regular occurrence of NFF), the man-
ufacturer (or supplier) may receive an unfavorable reputation
for unreliability and product replacements. These can be very
costly to the manufacturer if the product is warranted and re-
turns are much larger than forecast. Data released almost two
decades ago by British Airways (BA) demonstrates that the air-
line industry has for some time recognisee that large sums of
money can be wasted through high levels of NFF. In 1992 an
audit of component removals highlighted an average of 8,000
items removed from British Airways fleet per month. A total of
14 per cent of components, across all workshops, were found to
have NFF. Certain avionics equipment experienced 30 per cent
NFF. Financially, taking into account direct and indirect costs,
this equated to an annual NFF expenditure totalling £20 million
[7]. In 1993, BA was extremely concerned at the high cost of
removals where: nothing was found wrong, or the same fault re-
occurred. As a result, a task force which established that it was
not as bad as first suspected i.e. that 33% of all unscheduled
removals were NFF. The data they captured for 1992 showed
that 13.8% of all unscheduled removals that could be positively
identified as NFF. Nevertheless this was costing BA £17.6M
per year. The team also found that avionics components made
up 80.4% of all registered NFF; these components represented
26.6% of all avionics removals. Figures published by the Air
Transport Association (ATA) in 1997 estimated annual NFF
costs for an airline operating 200 aircraft at $20M, or $100,000
per aircraft per year. It is likely that a similar figure is true for
today’s airline industry, but some commentators argue that tak-
ing into account a decade of inflation and economies of scale
that the modern day figure could be at least twice the figure
offered by the Air Transport Association. Other studies show
that some 4500 NFF events were costing ATA member airlines
$100M annually [58]. Recent efforts within the US Air Force
to mitigate NFF focused on tackling individual avionic boxes,
such as the Modular lower Power Radio Frequency (MLPFR),
unit for the F-16. It was found that in excess of $2M in mainte-
nance costs were being incurred annually for just that one unit
at the maintenance depots [1].
Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner has recently raised concerns after
overheating batteries caught fire while the aircraft was parked
at Boston’s Logan International Airport [67]. Initial investi-
gations had suspected the two lithium-ion batteries, but where
ruled out as voltages had not exceeded the battery limits. Atten-
tions later focused on the electrical system that monitored the
battery voltage, charging and temperature. There was a direct
knock-on effect on businesses as many airlines had to ground
their aircrafts due to safety concerns. Analysts forecasted that
while aircrafts are out of service, it costed Boeing an estimated
£393M, while impacting their production line and future deliv-
eries. This issue probably cost additional hundreds of millions
as airlines are likely to seek financial compensation for their
delays. Recently, the Dreamliner has been returned to service
after some changes being made7 to its battery systems, while
the root causes of the battery failure still remain unknown to
the authors of this paper.
The impact of NFF on maintenance costs are not confined
to civilian airline operators, as in 1998, 10% of all Royal Air
Force (RAF) aircraft had reported faults as NFF. These figures
will obviously be different from operator to operator, as those
who have their own shops (or at least service and test facility)
would not be as worried as those who have a component ex-
change program. Also, Naval Air Systems Command (Navair)
has been reported to be have spent $94M on NFF equipment
removals due to wiring issues with unconfirmed faults [12]8. In
fact, findings demonstrated by Shannon et al. (2005) [68] show
that for some Naval avionic systems NFF rates can grow up to
60%. This contributes to the overall spending on time, cost,
manpower and resource allocation during maintenance activi-
ties.
7.2. In Consumer Electronics
Often an overlooked industry, which is also plagued by NFF
occurrences, is that of consumer electronics [32, 34]. Specif-
ically, the mobile phone industry had reported alarming fig-
ures outlining the cost of NFF. WDS Global reports that 14.3%
of mobile handsets are returned as faulty within the first year
of purchase by the consumer. In the UK this represents ap-
proximately £2.6M handsets (and £116M globally). Analysis
has also revealed that approximately 63% of these returns have
been made with no detectable faults. The mobile industry puts
the combined costs of administration, shipping and refurbish-
ment, collectively met by the operator, manufacturer and re-
tailer at £35 per device. Over the course of a year this fig-
ure equates to potential UK mobile industry losses of £54M.
More significantly, the cost to the global industry is estimated
at £2.8 ($4.5) billion. Fig. 6 illustrates that the NFF occurrence
in consumer electronics, such as mobile phones, is increasing
each year. This may be due to increasing sophistication of the
electronic components, including increases in complexity of
user interfaces, functionality and inadequate operating guide-
lines/instruction product manuals.
7.3. In Transport Vehicles
Rail: Rail transport often employs a number of standards to
guide implementation of control on safety risk in its system
7Investigators were still not able to identify precisely what caused the bat-
teries to overheat, and, in one case, ignite. Boeing’s fixes included better in-
sulation for battery cells, a stainless steel box designed to encase the batteries
and contain fire and vent possible smoke or hazardous gases out of the plane.
Initial tests performed demonstrated that the batteries are now much less likely
to overheat.
8The US Navy recognize NFF occurrences as a code: A-799. This is a
situation where a reported fault at the organizational level cannot be reproduced
(or detected) at another level of maintenance. The ‘A’ signifies the action taken
indicating a ‘discrepancy checked, no repair required’, where as the ‘799’ is a
fault code indicating a ‘malfunction could not be duplicated’
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Figure 6: Percentage of NFF in Modern-High Volume Consumer Electronics.
development life-cycle (these include IEC 62278 [69] or EN
50126 [70]). These are often used to provide railway authorities
with a procedure to enable the implementation of a consistent
approach to the management of Reliability, Availability, Main-
tainability and Safety (RAMS) aspects to meet projects require-
ments. Since NFF occurrences can affect rail service operation,
it is necessary to detect degradation before any heavy penal-
ties could be incurred. Typically, scheduled maintenance and
condition based monitoring are part of the maintenance policy,
however, if the occurrences of failures are intermittent in na-
ture, it becomes difficult to schedule maintenance in order to
increase system availability and reduce cost.
There are no numbers quantifying the monetary effect of NFF
on the rail industry in the currently available literature, but it
is possible to highlight the potential cost of NFF in signalling
failures by considering Railtrack. In 1999-2000, they reported
a total of 25,000 signalling failures on the UK rail network re-
sulted in delays totalling 760,000 minutes. A high proportion of
signalling failures are attributed to mechanical failures in rail-
way point systems, which results in a block to the rail signalling
system, to prevent rail vehicles passing over potentially faulty
points [24]. NFF incidents on railway points, often labeled as
‘Tested-OK’ are reportedly responsible for 11.3% of point ma-
chine faults. Therefore, it is easy to speculate that a substantial
amount of the economic consequences of signalling induced
delays, in terms of financial penalties, traffic throughput and
customer dissatisfaction are attributed to NFF events [71]. As
a percentage of total failure of common railway signalling as-
sets rail industry records illustrate that the occurrence of NFF
events is likely to be as high as 50% [72]. It is expected that
similar wasted efforts and financial burdens will also be occur-
ring in the Army, Navy, Wind Turbines, nuclear power plants
and high-end car industries.
Automotive: Thomas et al. (2002) [24] highlighted the costs
suffered by vehicle manufacturers in a case study for a Ford
electronic ignition unit, where the inability to rectify the unit’s
continuous NFF issues led to legal action against the company
resulting in a mandatory recall of the vehicles fitted with the
electronic ignition. Information regarding financial costs of
NFF within many industries in particular the aerospace indus-
try, is difficult to obtain with very little information in the public
domain. Some reasons for this which has become evident:
1. Sensitivity of the information: organizations are reluctant
to risk commercial data falling into the hands of a com-
petitor and within the aerospace industry there has always
been a culture of secrecy surrounding maintenance activi-
ties.
2. Industries just do not know exactly how much NFF is cost-
ing: one aspect of this is that the complexity of the NFF
issue results in difficulties in assigning an accurate finan-
cial figure within reasonable uncertainty levels.
3. In the current economic climate, many business depart-
ments are afraid to ‘admit their shortcomings’ and justify-
ing the budget being spent on unknown faults.
This means that there is no complete, robust and reliable cost
model currently available for measuring and calculating the fi-
nancial impact of NFF. Although. the warranty costs within the
automotive industry has been realized as the most significant
overhead. Globally, the automotive sector spend 1% to 3% of
its product revenue on warranty; warranty expenses associated
with recalls are approximately $12.3 billion annually exceeding
the manufacturers’ yearly profits [60]. This adds up to a vehi-
cle’s life-cycle cost, and more importantly, indicates the proven
potential of failure with a part which may reduce customer sat-
isfaction to damage vehicles’ brand image [13].
8. Safety Considerations in NFF
It can be argued that unless a NFF failure (that can have nu-
merous potential causes) is a repetitive fault, which is influenc-
ing the system performance, then an isolated incident cannot
be considered as a safety issue. However, the root cause of
the NFF problem might well be a safety concern. Soderholm
(2007) [1] classified NFF events into two distinct categories
those that affect safety, and those that do not. An NFF occur-
rence which would have an impact upon safety would be the
case where at any level of test there is a failure to recognisee
and correctly localize an actual fault. Conversely, tests which
result in false alarms, that is recognizing faults which do not
exist will cause an inconvenience, but generally will not affect
safety. In the case of inadequate diagnostic tools, the cause
of a failure may be indeterminate - making repair impossible.
This leads to fully functioning units being replaced, as a result
of poor maintenance practice and inadequate testing methods
faulty units often pass subsequent tests and are returned to the
field as potential safety hazards. After a study into NFF occur-
rences related to a faulty ignition device on vehicles manufac-
tured by the Ford Motor Company, Thomas et al. (2002) [24]
concluded that more responsibility is required by manufactur-
ers for ascertaining root causes, be that design/manufacturing
flaws, inadequate testing or even operator/customer error, of
returned safety-related products which have failed. Manufac-
turers should stop assuming that a safety-related returned prod-
uct is fit for service if it has passed the required routine check-
list tests; instead they should assume all safety-related products
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which are returned are treated as field-failures. The most cru-
cial NFF failure type which is most significant when consider-
ing safety is that of intermittency. A high profile organization
which has suffered from safety-related intermittent problems is
NASA. In 2005, for not the first time, a space shuttle launch
was delayed by three weeks due to an intermittent fault in a
fuel-level sensor that appeared during tanking tests and was re-
turned to an operational status without NASA ever discovering
the root problem and hence fixing it. The intermittent cause
of the circuitry that failed is one of four that would cut off the
shuttle’s three main engines if at least two showed that hydro-
gen fuel was running low. Should environmental launch con-
ditions cause intermittent conditions to reappear inadvertently,
the shuttle’s safety would have been compromised. A multitude
of back-to-back incidents within systems operated by NASA
has indicated that increased intermittency is a significant issue
in ageing electronics and their inability to detect this intermit-
tence and certify its testing practices as being adequate to en-
sure safe and reliable launch operations was a major concern.
The danger of not dealing adequately with NFF events relat-
ing to intermittent faults is also demonstrated through an inci-
dent on-board a BMI A321 at 36,000ft whilst carrying 43 pas-
sengers on route between Khartoum to Beirut. An intermit-
tent failure in the electrical power-generator systems presented
numerous symptoms which included an uncontrollable rudder
trim causing the left wing to dip by 10 ◦ and the aircraft to de-
viate from its intended course by 37km. In addition to this,
both the pilot and co-pilot’s instruments were affected with the
primary and navigational flight displays amongst other instru-
ments flickering or going entirely blank [73]. In this case the
aircraft landed safely, but it does highlight from a safety per-
spective the need for intermittent faults to be successfully de-
tected and localized during maintenance testing.
9. Conclusions
Organizations that often succeed in the long run have always
fine-tuned their processes, procedures, and constantly evolved
their ways to build a community both within and outside the
business. In order to start a cultural change, there appears to be
a definite need for ontology and, in some cases, an overhaul of
the terminology used for NFF. Industrial engineers representing
the UK aerospace industry have expressed their belief that the
term NFF (which is the most frequent term in use) quite possi-
ble provides a hindrance to reducing those cases labeled as NFF.
If the result of a test is described as ‘No Fault Found’ what does
this really mean and how is it perceived in the mind-set of the
test engineer? One way or another, there will be a repeat NFF
event either because a faulty unit re-enters service or the wrong
unit has been replaced. It needs to be acknowledged that the
NFF phenomenon cannot be a single event rather a sequence
that results in a series of actions at various maintenance levels
until finally a decision is made to add the NFF label and perform
one of the two actions above. What is the relationship between
the system design and an NFF failure? Many authors and practi-
tioners have alluded to the fact that there must be a relationship
or connection between NFF levels and the type of equipment,
complexity and equipment usage. The literature however has
not uncovered any serious research into this and no published
relationships have been found. It is however proposed that NFF
taxonomy needs to be standardized and a mechanism for prac-
tising process stapling, in order to track NFF occurrences that
have led to failure. Such areas which are of significant impor-
tance when trying to understand NFF would include:
1. The effect NFF failure has on specific types of equipment
(both financial and on performance)
2. Identifying the conditions in which failures are frequent
3. The rate at which NFF failures reoccur
4. The main influencing root causes
It is also important to understand the dependency that NFF
events have on repairable items, and how this may change
throughout their operational life-cycle. Such questions which
can be investigated include:
1. Do NFF problems become more common after initial re-
pair than after the original delivery?
2. Does the number of repairs have any influence?
3. Is there any impact of component modification?
In Part II, the authors will be examining the recent technical
solutions and troubleshooting methods that have been utilized
for achieving diagnostic success.
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